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The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches be reasonable.
The Supreme Court has interpreted this reasonableness requirement
as balancing an individual's right to privacy against the interests of the
government. Most searches require a warrant; however, there are well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception
is the single-purpose container exception for warrantless searches,
which is a derivative of the plain view doctrine for warrantless sei-
zures. The single-purpose container exception allows for the warrant-
less search of a container that is so distinctive that its contents are a
foregone conclusion and can therefore be said to be in plain view. Be-
cause these containers are thought to reveal their contents to the
world, they cannot sustain a reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts
have used this exception to permit the warrantless search of gun cases,
lock-picking sets, and wrapped bundles of cocaine.
A circuit split has developed over how the determination of the
single-purpose container should be made. The Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits have held that the determination of whether something consti-
tutes a single-purpose container should be made from the objective
viewpoint of a reasonable person, excluding the qualities not intrinsic
to the container itself. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that
this determination should be made from the subjective viewpoint of
the officer conducting the search, including the circumstances sur-
rounding the search. Resolving this issue requires balancing the priva-
cy rights of suspects against the need for law enforcement officers to
do their jobs.
This Comment argues that a two-step approach should be
adopted for the single-purpose container exception. First, the officer
should determine whether a container qualifies as a single-purpose
container. This determination should be made from a reasonable per-
son's viewpoint, but it should also include the surrounding circums-
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tances. Second, the requirements of the plain view doctrine-that the
officer has a legal right to see and access the container and that the
criminal nature is immediately apparent-should be applied to the
single-purpose container exception. This is a practical solution that
properly balances the competing privacy and governmental interests
at stake.
Part I chronicles the evolution of the single-purpose container
exception for warrantless searches, beginning with a brief history of
the Fourth Amendment. It then documents the evolution of the plain
view doctrine for warrantless seizures, ultimately ending with a de-
scription of the single-purpose container exception and how it has
been applied in circuit courts. Part II details the current circuit split
over whose viewpoint should be used for determining whether an
item constitutes a single-purpose container and over whether the sur-
rounding circumstances should be considered. Part III offers an alter-
native approach to the single-purpose container exception, describing
a two-step test. As the first step of the test, courts would make an ob-
jective determination as to whether the container qualifies as a single-
purpose container. As the second step, courts would apply the re-
quirements of the plain view doctrine to the situation. Part III applies
the two-step test to several fact patterns in order to illustrate how the
test would work in practice.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINGLE-PURPOSE CONTAINER EXCEPTION
A. History of the Fourth Amendment
The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment is divided into two separate clauses: one in-
volving unreasonable searches and seizures, and the other involving
probable cause for warrants. Although it is plausible to conclude that
"nothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be
conducted pursuant to warrants,"2 courts have read the two clauses in
1 US Const Amend IV.
2 Robbins v California, 453 US 420,438 (1981) (Rehnquist dissenting), overruled on other
grounds by United States v Ross, 456 US 798 (1982).
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conjunction and held that a search or seizure is presumed unreasona-
ble without a warrant based on probable cause
As a threshold question, courts must first determine whether a
"search" or "seizure" occurred, as not all searches and seizures qualify
for Fourth Amendment protection., Some actions of law enforcement
officers invade no legitimate privacy interest and therefore do not
constitute a search or a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' To
determine whether a legitimate privacy interest exists, the Supreme
Court adopted the two-pronged approach from the concurring opi-
nion in Katz v United States:' (1) the person must exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy and (2) the expectation must be one that "so-
ciety is prepared to recognize as reasonable."7 For example, a conver-
sation in a crowded public street is not protected because even though
the speaker may have subjectively expected the conversation to re-
main private, society does not consioder such an expectation of priva-
cy to be reasonable. Therefore, an officer overhearing the conversa-
tion is not conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment.8
After determining whether a search or seizure took place, courts
must then ask if the search or seizure was reasonable. Courts balance two
factors to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable: the degree
to which the search or seizure intrudes upon an individual's privacy is
balanced with the degree to which the search or seizure is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests These factors help
courts decide what level of suspicion the officers must have to justify the
search, and whether the intrusion requires a warrant or falls under one of
3 Katz v United States, 389 US 347,357 (1967).
4 See United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 113 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs when an expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of prop-
erty occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests
in that property.").
5 See Katz, 389 US at 350-51.
6 389 US 347 (1967).
7 Id at 361 (Harlan concurring) (quotation marks omitted). Though the Katz majority
opinion did not adopt the two-prong approach, it has since become the law. See California v
Greenwood, 486 US 35, 39 (1988) (noting that "warrantless search and seizure ... would violate
the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy ...
that society accepts as objectively reasonable"). See also Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 97
(1998) (Scalia concurring) (noting that the "benchmark" Katz test "has come to mean the test
enunciated by Justice [John Marshall] Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz"). It should also be
noted that the subjective prong of the Katz formulation has faded away, since the defendant can
always claim that he had a subjective expectation of privacy. See, for example, Nickolas J. Bohl,
Note, Unsheathing a Sharp Sword: Why National Security Letters are Permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, 86 BU L Rev 443,459 (2006).
8 See Katz, 389 US at 361.
9 Illinois v McArthur, 531 US 326,331 (2001).
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the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. ' Exceptions
to the warrant requirement and deviations from the probable cause stan-
dard have been made for searches and seizures involving "special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intru-
sions, [and] the like."" The rationales for these exceptions to the warrant
requirement are explored in Part II.C.
Of particular relevance to this Comment is the plain view excep-
tion, which allows for the warrantless seizure of illegal contraband
that is in plain view of an officer. 2 Circuit courts have extended this
doctrine to include the warrantless search of a closed container that so
"proclaims its contents" to the world as if the container is transpa-
rent.13 In other words, these single-purpose containers are of such a
character that it is as if the contents are in plain view- and therefore
the contents are subject to the plain view doctrine. Courts struggle,
however, with what qualifies as a single-purpose container."
B. The Plain View Exception
The single-purpose container exception for warrantless searches
was derived from the plain view doctrine for warrantless seizures. The
plain view doctrine allows for the warrantless seizure of goods in plain
view on the theory that "[t]he seizure of property in plain view in-
volves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assum-
ing that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity."" Since a plain view seizure does not infringe on any privacy
interest, it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.6 Additional-
ly, there is a governmental concern of destruction of evidence.17 This
10 See, for example, Katz, 389 US at 357.
11 McArthur, 531 US at 330. See, for example, Pennsylvania v Labron, 518 US 938, 940-41
(1996) (allowing a warrantless search of an automobile); Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) (permit-
ting a warrantless search based on reasonable suspicion during a temporary stop); Ker v Califor-
nia, 374 US 23, 40 (1963) (upholding a warrantless seizure to prevent imminent destruction of
evidence).
12 See Horton v California, 496 US 128, 135 (1990) (discussing the scope and the limits of
the plain view doctrine).
13 United States v Eschweiler, 745 F2d 435,440 (7th Cir 1984).
14 Compare United States v Gust, 405 F3d 797, 803 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that "courts
should assess the nature of a container primarily with reference to general social norms rather
than solely ... by the experience and expertise of law enforcement officers") (quotation marks
omitted) with United States v Williams, 41 F3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir 1994) (holding that a detec-
tive's experience could be used in assessing the character of a container).
15 Texas v Brown, 460 US 730,738 (1983), quoting Payton v New York, 445 US 573,586-87
(1980).
16 Horton,496 US at 133.
17 See Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321,327 (1987).
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minimal privacy intrusion, coupled with the legitimate law enforce-
ment interest, is the justification given for allowing the warrantless
seizure of goods in plain view.
In some circumstances, the plain view doctrine extends to opaque
containers. Containers that are unsealed and open are subject to the
plain view exception to the extent that the contents are visible. In
some cases, sealed containers may even be seized under the plain view
exception. If a sealed container filled with contraband has been pre-
viously opened by another law enforcement officer, the items inside
the container are said to be in plain view of the officer.18 Thus, any
reopening does not constitute a search "because it would [produce] no
additional invasion of [a] privacy interest," so long as the officer does
not exceed the examination done by the third party and so long as
there is not a substantial likelihood that the contents have changed.9
In order for an object to qualify under the plain view doctrine:
(1) the officer must be "lawfully located in a place from which the ob-
ject can be plainly seen," (2) the officer must have "lawful right of
access to the object," and (3) the criminal nature of the object must be
"immediately apparent." These requirements are meant "to supple-
ment the prior justification ... and permit[] the warrantless sei-
zure ... only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them."2' The doctrine is not meant to be "used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.' 2  Each requirement is tai-
lored towards minimizing the privacy intrusion and maximizing the
officer's ability to seize contraband.
1. The officer must be lawfully located in a place from which the
object can be plainly seen.
The first requirement of the plain view doctrine is that an officer
must make the plain view observation from a place where the officer
is legally permitted to beY In other words, the doctrine "is perhaps
18 Illinois v Andreas, 463 US 765, 770 (1983) (holding that a container that had been pre-
viously seized by a customs agent could lawfully be reseized by law enforcement officers).
19 Hicks, 480 US at 325. See also Andreas, 463 US at 773; Walter v United States, 447 US
649,656 (1980) (holding that the officers overstepped the bounds of the plain view exception by
viewing the film found inside a sealed container when the third party had only opened the con-
tainer to reveal the film).
20 Horton, 496 US at 136-37 (quotation marks omitted).
21 Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443,466 (1971).
22 Id.
23 Horton, 496 US at 137.
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better understood ... not as an independent 'exception' to the War-
rant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justifica-
tion for an officer's 'access to an object' may be." Typically, the cir-
cumstances that lead an officer to be in plain view of an object must
be supported by a valid search warrant for that location, an exigent
circumstance obviating the need for a warrant, or an otherwise legiti-
mate reason to be present." In Coolidge v New Hampshire," a plurali-
ty of the Supreme Court reasoned that by tying the plain view excep-
tion to a situation where the initial intrusion is justified, the doctrine
would be minimally invasive to the Fourth Amendment requirement
that a "magistrate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether
searches not based on probable cause."2' The Court determined that
eliminating this "needless inconvenience" of obtaining a warrant to
seize objects in plain view would be justified by a "major gain in effec-
tive law enforcement."'
2. The officer must have lawful right of access to the object.
The second requirement for the plain view doctrine is that the of-
ficer must have "a lawful right of access to the object itself."9 This re-
quirement simply means that there cannot be a legal constraint on an
officer's physical act of seizing, as opposed to simply viewing, an object.
In Coolidge, for example, officers seized cars that were parked in the
defendant's driveway." The Court held that this seizure violated the
Fourth Amendment since the officers did not have a warrant.' In Hor-
ton v California,32 the Court suggested that the outcome in Coolidge
may have rested on the fact that the officers could legally view the cars
24 Brown, 460 US at 738-39.
25 For some examples of these exigent circumstances and legitimate reasons, see Payton,
445 US at 587 (holding that under the Fourth Amendment an officer may need no justification to
access an item left in a public place); Michigan v Tyler, 436 US 499, 509 (1978) (holding that a
burning building is a sufficiently exigent circumstance to support warrantless entry and the
subsequent seizure of evidence found in plain view); Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas concurring) (holding that evidence found while in "hot pursuit" of the suspect did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
26 403 US 443 (1971).
27 Id at 467.
28 Id at 468,515.
29 Horton, 496 US at 137.
30 403 US at 448.
31 Id at 472-73.
32 496 US 128 (1990).
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from the street but had to perform an illegal trespass to seize them.3
This requirement prevents the plain view exception from becoming
overly intrusive upon privacy interests by precluding more serious inva-
sions like trespass without some other Fourth Amendment justification.
As a note, the plain view doctrine previously required that the
evidence must be discovered inadvertently. In Coolidge, the Court's
plurality concluded that to allow the warrantless seizure of objects
that officers knew would be in plain view would violate the Fourth
Amendment and "fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure." However, in Horton
the Court removed the inadvertence requirement, on the basis that
"evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon
the subjective state of mind of the officer."3 If a seizure falls within one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, there is no
reason why the officer's knowledge of the item should invalidate it.
36
3. The criminal nature of the object must be immediately apparent.
The last requirement for the plain view doctrine is that the crimi-
nal nature of the object must be immediately apparent. In Arizona
v Hicks," the Supreme Court decided that an officer needs probable
cause in order to seize an object under the plain view doctrine." The
Court reasoned that because the plain view doctrine was meant to
spare police the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant, there should be
no reason "why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have
been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been
known to be on the premises. 3 9 Therefore, since probable cause is re-
quired to obtain a warrant, probable cause is required for a warrant-
less seizure under the plain view doctrine.
Articulating exactly what probable cause entails is quite difficult.
Probable cause is a "commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that
deal[s] with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
33 Id at 137 ("Justice Harlan's vote in Coolidge may have rested on the fact that the seizure
of the cars was accomplished by means of a warrantless trespass on the defendant's property.").
34 403 US at 471.
35 496 US at 138.
36 See id at 138-39.
37 480 US 321 (1987).
38 Id at 326.
39 Id at 327.
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on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. '""
Doctrinally, probable cause "merely requires that the facts available to
the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,'
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime.". It is something less than preponderance of the
evidence,2 but it is something more than a mere suspicion.3 Courts
have moved away from the viewpoint of the reasonable man, and to-
ward the viewpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer when
determining whether probable cause exists, giving "due weight to infe-
rences" made by the officers." This has held true in determining prob-
able cause for plain view seizures.
The Supreme Court has taken into account an officer's expe-
rience in determining whether there was probable cause to believe
that the criminal nature was immediately apparent. In Texas v
Brown," during a routine traffic stop an officer seized a party balloon
filled with heroin that was located on the passenger seat.6 The balloon
was tied with a knot, so its contents could not be seen." In upholding
the warrantless seizure, the Court noted that the balloon's distinctive
character "spoke volumes ... to the trained eye of the officer," indicat-
ing that an officer could use his experience to determine whether the
criminal nature was immediately apparent. 8 Furthermore, Justice
Lewis Powell remarked in his concurrence that it has long been "rec-
ognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well
elude an untrained person.9
40 Ornelas v United States, 517 US 690,695 (1996), quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213,231
(1983).
41 Brown, 460 US at 742, quoting Carroll v United States, 267 US 132,162 (1925).
42 Brown, 460 US at 742. ("A 'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evi-
dence is involved is all that is required.").
43 Gates, 462 US at 231 (noting that probable cause is a difficult standard to define, and
relies upon a common sense assessment based on the experience of an officer).
44 Ornelas, 517 US at 690.
45 460 US 730 (1983).
46 Id at 733-35.
47 Id.
48 Id at 743. See also Washington v Chrisman, 455 US 1, 4 (1982) (emphasizing the officer's
"training and experience" in upholding the plain view seizure).
49 Brown, 460 US at 746 (Powell concurring).
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Courts have established these requirements to balance govern-
mental interests with privacy concerns. Requiring that the officer have
probable cause and legal authority to be in a position to view and se-
ize the contraband minimizes the potential intrusiveness of a plain
view seizure, while removal of the inadvertence requirement no long-
er unnecessarily impedes law enforcement officers. As a derivative of
the plain view exception, the single-purpose container exception in-
corporates these rationales into its doctrine.
C. The Single-purpose Container Exception
In general, an object that has been placed inside a "closed, opa-
que container" maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, regard-
less of the container's contents.50 These "[e]xpectations of privacy are
established by general social norms."" In Arkansas v Sanders," howev-
er, the Supreme Court declared in a footnote that some containers so
obviously betray their contents that there can be no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the
course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar
tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be in-
ferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases
the contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby
obviating the need for a warrant.
In Robbins v California," the Supreme Court interpreted this
footnote to mean that "unless the container is such that its contents
may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment."" The Court reasoned that by comparing
these single-purpose containers to containers that were literally open,
thereby displaying their contents, the Sanders Court was implying that
only the most obvious containers qualify as single-purpose containers.
Therefore, any container that does not "so clearly announce its con-
50 Robbins, 453 US at 426 ("Once placed within such a container, a diary and a dishpan are
equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.").
51 Id at 428.
52 442 US 753 (1979), overruled on other grounds by California v Acevedo, 500 US 565 (1991).
53 Sanders, 442 US at 764 n 13.
54 453 US 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Ross, 456 US at 798.
55 Robbins, 453 US at 427.
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tents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or oth-
erwise, [so] that its contents are obvious to an observer" is something
less than a single-purpose container and deserves the full protection
of the Fourth Amendment.56
The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Brown to uphold a
warrantless seizure of a balloon containing drugs;57 however, the Court
did not mention the Sanders footnote. The Court held that the war-
rantless seizure was constitutional, despite the fact that no drugs were
visible, because "the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke
volumes as to its contents -particularly to the trained eye of the offic-
er."58 In other words, the drugs were essentially in plain view, and thus
could be seized without a warrant under the plain view exception.
Circuit courts have upheld the single-purpose container excep-
tion,"5 despite the fact that both Sanders and Robbins were overruled. 6
Courts have held that "when a container is 'not closed,' or 'transpa-
rent,' or when its 'distinctive configuration ... proclaims its contents,'
the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and the
contents can be said to be in plain view."1 These courts held that since
the warrantless searches in Sanders and Robbins were later upheld
due to the reduced expectation of privacy one has inside a vehicle, this
reasoning should be extended to other containers that could not main-
tain a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In general, labeling a container will qualify it as a single-purpose
container.63 A labeled container "unequivocally reveal[s] its contents,"
56 Id at 428.
57 Brown, 460 US at 743.
58 Id (emphasis added).
59 See, for example, United States v Banks, 514 F3d 769, 775 (8th Cir 2008); United States v
Meada, 408 F3d 14,23 (1st Cir 2005).
60 See Acevedo, 500 US at 577 (overruling Sanders because "the Fourth Amendment does
not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within
the vehicle"); Ross, 456 US at 824:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the
container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.
61 See, for example, United States v Donnes, 947 F2d 1430, 1437 (10th Cir 1991) (noting that
while Sanders and Robbins were overruled because they involved the searches of automobiles,
the reasoning behind the cases remains compelling).
62 See, for example, id at 1438 (declining to extend the plain view container exception to a
camera lens case).
63 See, for example, Banks, 514 F3d at 775 (holding that a gun case labeled "Phoenix Arms"
"is obviously a gun case"); Meada, 408 F3d at 23 (holding that a search of a gun case labeled
"Gun Guard" was constitutional under the single-purpose container exception); Eschweiler, 745
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and as such is "transparent in the contemplation of the law."6 That the
container may not actually contain what it proclaims to the world is
"irrelevant," so long as the presumed contents of the container give
the officer cause to search."5 For example, in United States v Meada 6
the defendant was carrying a gun case and, as a convicted felon, was
forbidden from doing so." The court found that the gun case was a
single-purpose container, despite "the fact that, upon opening and
careful inspection, the gun case might turn out to contain something
other than a gun."'
The single-purpose container exception, however, is limited by
the plain view exception, and is therefore subject to the same re-
quirements. This means that the criminal nature of the container must
be immediately apparent-it is not enough that a container be de-
signed for a single purpose. For example, in United States v Villarreal,69
the court held that drums labeled as phosphoric acid but actually filled
with marijuana could not be searched without a warrant under the
single-purpose container exception because phosphoric acid is not
incriminating.'0 The court did note that the case may have been differ-
ent if the drums were labeled "marijuana. ' "'
Under the rationale of the plain view exception, it seems very
logical that any container that reveals its contraband to the world
would be searchable without a warrant-after all, it is as if the contra-
band is in plain view and is therefore subject to the same require-
ments as objects that are in plain view. But courts disagree over the
proper way to determine what qualifies as a single-purpose container.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although the single-purpose container exception is widely recog-
nized, circuit courts are split over two issues: (1) from whose view-
point to consider whether or not a container is a single-purpose con-
tainer and (2) whether the circumstances surrounding the search can
F2d at 440 (holding that a warrantless search of an envelope containing the key to a safe-deposit
box and labeled as such was constitutional).
64 Eschweiler, 745 F2d at 440.
65 Meada, 408 F3d at 24.
66 408 F3d 14 (1st Cir 2005).
67 Id at 24.
68 Id.
69 963 F2d 770 (5th Cir 1992).
70 Id at 776.
71 Id.
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be considered in making the determination. 2 The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have held that the determination of a single-purpose contain-
er is determined from the viewpoint of an objective layman, excluding
the circumstances surrounding the search. The Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, however, have held that the determination is made from the
viewpoint of the officer, including the circumstances surrounding the
search. This inquiry includes any experience and subjective knowledge
that the officer may have regarding the container. This Part describes
the methods and the justifications used by the courts on each side of
the circuit split.
A. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits' Approach
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have taken the approach that a sin-
gle-purpose container is determined from the viewpoint of a layman,
excluding the surrounding circumstances of the search. In 1985, the
Ninth Circuit tackled this issue in United States v Miller.3 In Miller,
DEA agents opened, without a warrant, a plastic bag containing an
opaque, fiberglass container of cocaine after the white powder on the
outside of the bag tested negative for cocaine." The court held that
since the bag was not transparent and did not have a distinctive shape
or odor, it did not "announce to the observer that it contained a con-
trolled substance. ' 5 In doing this, the court disregarded the govern-
ment's contentions that the DEA agent knew from the appearance
and circumstances of the bag's discovery that it contained cocaine."
The Ninth Circuit read Robbins as narrowing the single-purpose con-
tainer exception in Sanders." The court stated:
Because this rationale [in Sanders] focuses upon the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, which is established by "gen-
eral social norms [according to Robbins]," the extent to which a
container's exterior reveals its contents should not be solely de-
72 Compare United States v Gust, 405 F3d 797, 803 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that "courts
should assess the nature of a container primarily with reference to general social norms rather
than solely ... by the experience and expertise of law enforcement officers") (quotation marks
omitted), quoting United States v Miller, 769 F2d 554, 560 (9th Cir 1985) with United States v
Williams, 41 F3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir 1994) (holding that a detective's experience could be used
in assessing the character of a container).




77 Miller, 769 F2d at 559.
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termined either by the circumstances of its discovery, or by the
experience and expertise of law enforcement officers."
Furthermore, the court distinguished the issue here of single-
purpose container searches from the issue in Brown, which relied on
an officer's expertise to permit the warrantless seizure of a balloon
filled with drugs." In Brown, the Court held that the contraband was
in plain view because it was inside a single-purpose container, and
thus could be seized under the plain view exception." The Miller court
reasoned that the Sanders single-purpose container exception referred
to searches, while Brown used the single-purpose container theory to
justify a warrantless seizure.8' The court seemed to imply with this dis-
tinction that the seizure of a single-purpose container can be based on
an officer's experience, while the search of a single-purpose container
cannot be based on an officer's experience. The court may have been
distinguishing between the act of determining whether a container is a
single-purpose container and the act of deciding whether the criminal
nature is immediately apparent -a requirement of the plain view doc-
trine. This distinction eliminates the need to account for the officer's
experience in a search case.
The Ninth Circuit also listed practical concerns about why the de-
termination of a single-purpose container is made from the layman's
objective viewpoint.n It noted that allowing officers to use their sub-
jective knowledge "would increase significantly the risk of erroneous
police decisions on whether there is sufficient certainty to permit a
warrantless search."'' Moreover, in United States v Gust,' the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that basing the single-purpose container determina-
tion on an officer's subjective knowledge would swallow the warrant
requirement.5 Such a standard would have allowed warrantless
searches to be performed on harmless containers "based solely on
probable cause derived from the officers' subjective knowledge and the
78 Id at 560.
79 Id.
80 See id at 559 ("The defendant in Brown challenged only the seizure ... and the Supreme
Court addressed only the seizure issue .... Consequently, we do not apply the Brown rule here.").
81 Id.
82 Miller, 769 F2d at 560.
83 Id, quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 7.2(e) at 245 (Supp 1978 & 1985 Pocket Part).
84 405 F3d 797 (9th Cir 2005).
85 Id at 802.
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circumstances."2 This would go against the longstanding belief that
probable cause alone should not justify a warrantless search or seizure."
The Tenth Circuit has also read Sanders as requiring the determi-
nation of a single-purpose container to be made from the objective
perspective of a layman, though it gave no reasoning.m In United States
v Bonitz,89 the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant.'O In con-
ducting the arrest, the officers came across a "closed, hard plastic
case" containing a rifle alongside other "soft-sided gun cases."9 The
court held that while the soft-sided gun cases could "self-reveal" their
contents, the hard plastic case could not. It reasoned that although a
firearms expert may have recognized the container as a gun case, the
container did not so "reveal its contents" and "from its outward ap-
pearance, might have contained camera equipment or technical in-
struments instead."" The court also cited historical reasons, fearing
that an expansion of warrantless searches would lead to abuse.-
The Tenth Circuit approached the issue again in United States
v Donnes, 5 when, during an arrest, an officer noticed a "bulging" glove
on the floor with a syringe and a camera lens case peeking out.2 In
holding that the warrantless search of the camera lens case was un-
constitutional, the court declined to extend the single-purpose con-
tainer exception to "a container as ambiguous as a camera lens case,"
despite the fact that the lens case was found in a glove with a syringe.2
The court feared that expanding the single-purpose container excep-
tion to include the qualities independent of the container surrounding
the search would permit officers to conduct a "warrantless search of
any container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item.""' This expan-
sion of the single-purpose container exception would lead to more
warrantless searches based solely on probable cause.
86 Id (quotation marks omitted).
87 Id.
88 See United States v Donnes, 947 F2d 1430, 1438 (10th Cir 1991); United States v Bonitz,
826 F2d 954,957 (10th Cir 1987).
89 826 F2d 954 (10th Cir 1987).
90 Id at 955.
91 Id at 955-56.
92 Id at 957.
93 Bonitz, 826 F2d at 956.
94 Id at 958 ("Deeply troubled by police searches of homes and offices, and realizing the
inherent temptations and persistent dangers of abuse, the Founding Fathers placed the fourth
amendment into the Constitution.").
95 947 F2d 1430 (10th Cir 1991).
96 Id at 1433-34.
97 Id at 1438.
98 Id.
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B. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits' Approach
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, have taken
the approach that the determination of a single-purpose container is
made from the viewpoint of the officer, including the circumstances
surrounding the search. In United States v Williams," the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that if the contents of a container are a "foregone conclu-
sion" either because it is not closed, transparent, or of such a "distinc-
tive configuration" that it proclaims its contents, then there is no ex-
pectation of privacy in the container."' The court then added that "the
circumstances under which an officer finds the container may add to
the apparent nature of its contents.""]1 In Williams, officers accidentally
opened a suitcase to reveal two packages wrapped in brown material
and cellophane.' They seized the suitcase, and a detective opened the
cellophane-wrapped package to reveal cocaine."' The court upheld the
search of the cellophane package as constitutional."' In doing so, the
court cited the detective's ten years of narcotics experience and the
fact that the suitcase contained fewer items than a person would typi-
cally carry when travelling.' ° The court also cited Brown, in which the
Supreme Court referred to the officer's "trained eye" to justify a war-
rantless seizure."' The Fourth Circuit later held that any legally seized
container for which the contents are a foregone conclusion can be
searched under the "plain view container doctrine."' ' While this seems
confusing, the court may have been relying on Justice John Paul Ste-
vens's concurrence in Brown to justify this proposition. In Brown, Jus-
tice Stevens remarked that if the balloon were of the kind only used to
transport drugs, viewing it could give "the officer a degree of certainty
that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin itself."'. He further
stated that if that fact were true, "the plain view doctrine [would] sup-
port[] the search as well as the seizure even though the contents of the
balloon were not actually visible to the officer.""' Here, the court used
99 41 F3d 192 (4th Cir 1994).
100 Id at 197 (quotation marks omitted).
101 Id.
102 Id at 194 (describing how a baggage service agent found the packages after opening a
suitcase to match its contents with the contents described in a lost baggage report).
103 Williams, 41 F3d at 195.
104 Id at 198.
105 Id at 197-98.
106 Id at 197.
107 Williams,41 F3d at 198.
108 460 US at 751 (Stevens concurring).
109 Id.
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the detective's experience to assert that he knew to a degree of cer-
tainty that the cellophane-wrapped packages contained cocaine, and
thus upheld the warrantless search.
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit noted the split between the circuit
courts, but declined to choose a side."° In an earlier case, however, the
court alluded to the fact that the circumstances under which a con-
tainer is seized may justify a warrantless search, although ultimately
deciding the case on other grounds."' The court noted:
Several Justices-almost certainly a majority-believe however
that if the shape or other characteristics of the container, taken
together with the circumstances in which it is seized (from a sus-
pected drug dealer, or a harmless old lady?), proclaim its con-
tents unambiguously, there is no need to obtain a warrant.' 2
In summary, circuit courts disagree over how to determine
whether an object constitutes a single-purpose container. The Ninth
and Tenth Circuits use a reasonable person standard when determin-
ing whether a container is a single-purpose container. They do not
include any of the qualities not intrinsic to the container itself. The
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, use the officer's sub-
jective viewpoint to determine whether a container is a single-purpose
container. They also take into account the surrounding circumstances.
III. RESOLUTION
The origin of the single-purpose container exception-a footnote
in Sanders -provides little guidance as to its application. It does not
indicate from whose viewpoint single-purpose container determina-
tions should be made, nor does it say anything about the surrounding
circumstances. To determine the appropriate standard under the
Fourth Amendment, the privacy interests must be balanced with the
governmental interests."3 Therefore, the best interpretation of the sin-
110 See United States v Tejada, 524 F3d 809,813 (7th Cir 2008).
M See United States v Cardona-Rivera, 904 F2d 1149, 1156 (7th Cir 1990) (holding that
while the "kilo brick of cocaine wrapped in plain brown paper fastened with tape is not as re-
vealing of its contents as the examples [of a single-purpose container] we have given," the defen-
dant's answer that cocaine was inside of the package "stripped the cloak of secrecy from the
package").
112 Id at 1155 (emphasis added).
113 McArthur, 531 US at 331.
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gle-purpose container exception should balance the degree to which
the search intrudes upon an individual's privacy interests with the de-
gree to which the search is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. The single-purpose container exception, how-
ever, is improperly characterized as an exception to the warrant re-
quirement for searches. It requires an initial determination of whether
the container is a single-purpose container. Without this initial inquiry
into expectations of privacy, the balance tilts too far toward accom-
modating government interests.
This Comment proposes a two-step process for the single-
purpose container determination. First, courts should apply a reasona-
ble person standard to determine whether a container qualifies as a
single-purpose container. This standard should include the qualities
independent of the container. Because a single-purpose container is
one that "cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy,""' the
courts should follow the Katz test for reasonable expectation of priva-
cy-that is: (1) the person must exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy, and (2) the expectation must be one that "society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.""' This test includes the circumstances as a
reasonable person would see them. This step determines whether the
contents of the container are in plain view at all, because if a container
is a single-purpose container it is essentially displaying its contents to
the world. Second, courts should determine whether the single-
purpose container meets the requirements of the plain view excep-
tion-that is, the officer must be in a position to lawfully view and
access the object, and the criminal nature must be immediately appar-
ent. The most relevant requirement to the single-purpose container
exception is whether the criminal nature is immediately apparent. As
with the plain view exception, law enforcement officers can use their
experience and knowledge to determine whether the criminal nature
is readily apparent. This would include any particularized information
that the officer has, such as the individual's prosecution history and
knowledge of the drug trade.
A. The Single-purpose Container Determination Should Be Made
from the Reasonable Person's Perspective
The two-step process for the single-purpose container first re-
quires a determination of (1) whether the container is a single-
114 Sanders, 442 US at 764 n 13.
115 389 US at 361 (Harlan concurring).
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purpose container followed by (2) an application of the plain view
doctrine to the single-purpose container. The single-purpose container
determination can be made from three viewpoints: the reasonable
person, the reasonable officer, or the subjective officer. Part III.A ar-
gues that the reasonable person viewpoint should be used for the sin-
gle-purpose container determination because it aligns better with the
Fourth Amendment and reasonable expectations of privacy. Addition-
ally, Part III.A argues that the reasonable officer's and the subjective
officer's viewpoints present problems to the Fourth Amendment be-
cause they allow for uneven enforcement of the law and present prob-
lems at trial.
The Fourth Circuit uses the officer's subjective point of view to
determine whether a container is a single-purpose container. In Wil-
liams, the court reasoned that if the contents of the container are a
foregone conclusion to the officer, it is as if they are in plain view of
the officer and as such should be subject to the plain view exception. "
Though the court offers no other reasons for using the officer's subjec-
tive viewpoint, there are many obvious advantages to it-particularly
in the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. If it is a fore-
gone conclusion to the officer that the container is filled with contra-
band, there is a legitimate governmental interest that the officer
should not have to turn her back on crime. Officers are asked to make
various judgments on a daily basis, and this situation is no different.
More importantly, officers are equipped with information meant to
detect and prevent crimes, many involving drugs or gun violence. It
seems counterintuitive to provide officers with this information and
experience, while not allowing them to take advantage of this informa-
tion when it comes to warrantless searches. But, the reasonableness
test of the Fourth Amendment relies on more than legitimate go-
vernmental interests, and using a subjective viewpoint for the single-
purpose container determination significantly intrudes on an individ-
ual's privacy interests.
1. Determination from the reasonable person's viewpoint aligns
better with the Katz formulation of the expectation of privacy.
By definition, a single-purpose container "cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy," and therefore it is as though the
container's contents are in plain view.l" Under Katz, there is no search
116 Williams,41 F3d at 198.
117 Sanders,442 US at 764 n 13.
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if society does not recognize an individual's privacy expectation as
reasonable."8 Therefore, the examination of a single-purpose container
would not qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment. Because
of this result, the proper inquiry to be made when determining wheth-
er a container qualifies as a single-purpose container is to determine
whether the container supports a reasonable expectation of privacy
under Katz-that is, whether there exists a subjective expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Exactly what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
difficult question, but Fourth Amendment case law indicates that it is
framed by social norms and by third-party actions."9 The fact that
access is available to the general public, and not simply to officers, is a
strong indication that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Moreover, the Court in Katz emphasized that "[w]hat a person kno-
wingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection...... This indicates that the single-purpose container deter-
mination should be made from the viewpoint of the reasonable per-
son. While an officer may recognize a shapeless black bag as a gun
case, the reasonable person may not. The reasonable person loses
Fourth Amendment protection despite the fact that he did not kno-
wingly expose his goods to the public if an officer can determine, from
his viewpoint, that the gun case is a single-purpose container.
It is for this reason that the Fourth Circuit's use of the officer's
subjective viewpoint is erroneous. In Williams, the court held that if
the contents of a container are a foregone conclusion to an officer, the
defendant's expectation of privacy is unreasonable.' Under Katz,
however, a reasonable expectation of privacy is a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. This
reasonableness requirement is a reasonable person test, not a subjec-
tive test. Because the reasonable person viewpoint more closely aligns
with the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, it should be used
for making the single-purpose container determination.
118 389 US at 361 (Harlan concurring).
119 See, for example, Florida v Riley, 488 US 445, 450 (1989) (holding that because the air-
ways were open to the general public, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
backyard greenhouse); California v Greenwood, 486 US 35, 40 (1988) (holding that individuals
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage bags, as their contents are "rea-
dily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, [and] snoops").
120 Riley, 488 US at 451 (noting that the officer "did no more" than any member of the
public could have done).
121 389 US at 351 (emphasis added).
122 41 F3d at 198.
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2. Using the officer's viewpoint would have different results in
similar situations because it would be officer dependent.
The Fourth Circuit's use of the officer's subjective viewpoint
presents another problem because it would lead to uneven enforce-
ment of the law. Using the officer's subjective viewpoint to make the
determination of a single-purpose container means that the reasona-
bleness of a search depends on that officer's expertise, which can lead
to different results in the exact same situation, depending on which
officer is in the room. For example, if an officer recognizes a gun case
in one situation, but another officer would not, that container would
not consistently be a single-purpose container. These differing results
pose many problems for an individual's privacy rights.
Perhaps most importantly, a subjective determination means that
individuals can never be sure of their Fourth Amendment rights with
respect to closed containers. Accordingly, individuals would have no
way to adjust their behavior. It would be difficult to know whether a
container is a single-purpose container in advance, because that de-
termination would not be made until the officer steps into the room
with the subjective knowledge necessary to make that determination.
Extending this to the extreme, it would be difficult for an individual to
maintain an expectation of privacy in a container because there is al-
ways the chance that it may be deemed a single-purpose container later.
One response to these problems would be to use the reasonable
officer, and not that particular officer, when determining whether or
not a container is a single-purpose container. This poses several prob-
lems. First, this would not solve the fact that the reasonable officer's
viewpoint does not line up with society's formulation of reasonable
expectation of privacy. Second, courts have noted the difficulty in de-
fining a reasonable officer.'2 Police practices vary by geographic loca-
tion, officer rank, and from situation to situation. There could be as
many "reasonable officers" as there are individual officers.
Lastly, it is not clear that the reasonable officer would be all that
different from the subjective officer. Presumably, courts would decide
whether the officer was acting as a reasonable officer based on pre-
cinct training. For instance, if officers were trained to recognize duct
tape covered blocks as cocaine, courts would hold that the reasonable
officer would recognize duct tape covered blocks as a single-purpose
123 See Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 815 (1996) (responding to the petitioners' argu-
ments that a reasonable officer would not have made a stop by noting that the reasonable officer
standard is difficult to define because police enforcement practices vary by locale and time).
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container. It seems highly unlikely that there would ever be a circums-
tance where the officer was not trained to recognize the object that
was searched. This would reduce single-purpose containers to merely
suspicious containers. In reality, the reasonable officer would almost
always be the same as the individual officer, and therefore the two
viewpoints should be treated as one.2 '
3. The defendant could never disprove the officer's state of
mind at trial if the officer's viewpoint were used for the sin-
gle-purpose container determination.
An officer's subjective determination for a single-purpose con-
tainer also poses some practical concerns. If the determination is made
from the officer's subjective point of view, it would be very hard for
the defendant to ever prevail in court, since the defendant would be
forced to disprove the officer's state of mind. At a trial to exclude evi-
dence from a warrantless search, the burden is on the government to
prove that the warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions
under the Fourth Amendment. " ' If the determination of a single-
purpose container is based on "specialized experience and training,"
an officer would merely have to show that his training and experience
led him to believe that the container was a single-purpose container.
26
Given that the officer did find contraband, and given that the officer
did search the container, it seems unlikely that the court would find
that the officer did not correctly identify the container as a single-
purpose container. '27 As the dissent in United States v Prandy-Binetts
said, "This is a sham." 9 Using a subjective determination allows offic-
ers to act on a hunch, and when "the hunch proves to be correct and
the arrest bears fruit, the court will hold ... that 'the record firmly
supports the detective's inference...'' This system will reinforce itself
and work against the defendant. Using the reasonable person's view-
point would solve this problem. Instead of being linked to an officer's
expectation of privacy, and therefore to the officer's training and ex-
perience, the single-purpose container determination would be linked
124 Consider id (noting that determinations of how a "reasonable officer" would act based on
police manuals and standard procedures would be "reduced to speculati[ons] about the hypotheti-
cal reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity").
125 McDonald v United States, 335 US 451,456 (1948).
126 United States v Prandy-Binett, 995 F2d 1069, 1074 (DC Cir 1993) (Edwards dissenting).
127 See, for example, Florida v White, 526 US 559,570 (1999) (Stevens dissenting).
128 995 F2d 1069 (DC Cir 1993).
129 Id at 1071 (Edwards dissenting).
130 Id.
2009] 1829
The University of Chicago Law Review
to the reasonable person's expectation of privacy, and therefore to
general social norms.
This is not to say that using the layman's perspective to deter-
mine a single-purpose container is without its flaws. In many circums-
tances, requiring an officer to obtain a warrant for a search may prove
to be a hassle at best, or a danger at worst. In almost all circumstances
that an officer wishes to search a suspected single-purpose container,
the officer would be able to get a warrant to search and seize the ob-
ject. Given that officers may use their training and experience to es-
tablish probable cause under the plain view doctrine and to obtain a
warrant, many of the objects seized would easily be granted a warrant.
From a law enforcement perspective, it makes sense to dispense with
the warrant requirement for searches under the plain view doctrine, as
it would be a mere formality. But, this is more than a mere formality to
the defendant whose container is being seized. The objective point of
view allows an individual to form an expectation of privacy in the con-
tainer, so she can realize her Fourth Amendment rights. Because of the
relatively large intrusion on an individual's privacy interests, the rea-
sonable person viewpoint should be used instead of the officer's subjec-
tive viewpoint when making a single-purpose container determination.
B. Applying the Single-purpose Container Doctrine in Practice
The single-purpose container exception should be applied in two
steps: (1) a determination of a single-purpose container, and (2) the
application of the single-purpose container to the plain view require-
ments. It is difficult to grasp the differences between this single-
purpose determination and this application of the single-purpose con-
tainer to the plain view exception without concrete examples.
Part III.B clarifies how the single-purpose container exception would
be applied in practice, while Part III.C discusses why this two-step
process should be used.
1. Transparent containers.
A transparent container is the quintessential single-purpose con-
tainer. Because it is transparent, the container quite literally an-
nounces its contents to the world, and therefore can support no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. But, this does not mean that a contain-
er is instantly subject to the plain view exception; the criminal nature
must also be readily apparent. It does not follow that because a con-
tainer is a single-purpose container it is also subject to the plain view
exception. For instance, inside of a nursery, a glass container filled with
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white powder qualifies as a single-purpose container. There is no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. However, this container may not be
seized under the plain view doctrine, as the criminal nature is not im-
mediately apparent. If the circumstances were changed slightly, the
criminal nature would be immediately apparent. If this glass container
were located in a crackhouse, the officer could use his experience with
drugs as a basis for probable cause that the powder is cocaine. This is
one example of how not all single-purpose containers qualify for war-
rantless seizure under the plain view doctrine.
2. The Brown balloon.
In Brown, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless seizure of a
party balloon filled with cocaine."' In doing so, the Court noted that the
balloon's distinctive character "spoke volumes ... to the trained eye of
the officer.' '32 Circuit courts have used this rationale to justify making
the single-purpose container determination from the officer's view-
point.'33 Under the new framework, the reasonable person viewpoint
reaches the same result as the Brown Court. In Brown, the heroin-filled
balloon was located next to small plastic vials, loose white powder, and
an open bag of balloons."' Using a reasonable person's point of view, it
is clear that the balloon was filled with the loose white powder. Because
the balloon was located next to empty balloons and a white powder, it is
a "foregone conclusion" that the balloon contained the white powder. It
does not matter that the balloon may not have actually contained white
powder, because the image the balloon was presenting to the world was
that it did contain white powder. "' Therefore, the balloon qualifies as a
single-purpose container. In determining whether there was probable
cause to believe that the criminal nature was immediately apparent, the
officer can take into account his experience and training. Because the
officer was familiar with narcotics, the officer could infer that there was
probable cause to believe that the combination of white powder and
balloons meant that drugs were involved.'l
131 Brown, 460 US at 733-35.
132 Id at 743.
133 See, for example, Williams, 41 F3d at 197.
134 460 US at 734.
135 See Meada, 408 F3d at 24 (explaining that a search of a gun case was justified because
the case reasonably appeared to contain a gun).
136 Consider Brown, 460 US at 734 (describing the officer's previous experience with how
narcotics are packaged).
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The situation would have been different had there been no white
powder or vials next to the filled balloon. In that circumstance, a filled
balloon would not qualify as a single-purpose container-the balloon
would give no indication of what was located inside of it. This is one
example of how circumstances can influence the expectation of priva-
cy. Moreover, it shows how the reasonable person viewpoint correctly
balances privacy and governmental interests. Also, an officer may then
use his experience and training to determine whether there is proba-
ble cause to seize a container, ensuring that the balance is not tipped
too far in favor of individual privacy interests.
3. The cellophane-wrapped package from Williams.
The next situation involves a container that would pass the re-
quirements of the plain view exception, but would not satisfy the ini-
tial no-expectation-of-privacy hurdle. Since this initial step is not satis-
fied, it does not matter that the probable cause prong is satisfied. In
Williams, officers found a square-shaped, cellophane-wrapped pack-
age inside a suitcase. '37 The only other objects inside the suitcase were
towels, blankets, and one shirt."8 The court held that because the offic-
er recognized the circumstances as one in which drugs were often in-
volved, the container was a single-purpose container and did not re-
quire a search warrant. "
Under the two-step single-purpose container method, this would
not fall under the single-purpose container exception. First, a single-
purpose container determination must be made from the viewpoint of
the reasonable person. Although the suitcase contained only towels,
these circumstances shed no light on what is inside the container. It
merely looks suspicious, not single-purpose. One possibility was that
the package contained drugs; another possibility was that it was some-
thing fragile that was packaged for travel. These suspicious circums-
tances do not rise to the level where the contents of the package are
such a "foregone conclusion" to the reasonable person that the pack-
age could not support a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although
the criminal nature of the package may have been immediately ap-
parent to the officer, and it is likely the officer could have obtained a
search warrant for the package, the contents of the container were not
in plain view because the container was not a single-purpose contain-
137 41 F3d at 195.
138 Id.
139 Id at 198.
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er. Therefore, it is not necessary to move onto step two and determine
whether the requirements of the plain view doctrine were met.
C. The Surrounding Circumstances Should Be Included in the Sin-
gle-purpose Container Determination because the Situation Af-
fects the Reasonable Person's Expectations of Privacy
The last consideration in the single-purpose container determina-
tion is whether the surrounding circumstances should be included.
Because of the interest in balancing privacy interests with governmen-
tal interests, the surrounding circumstances should be included in the
single-purpose container determination.
Courts have declined to include the surrounding circumstances
on the grounds that the circumstances of discovery should not affect
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, which are based on
general social norms."' But, individuals do not live in a bubble. Social
norms include not only what society thinks of that container, but what
society thinks of that container in context. Short of being transparent,
one can never truly know what is inside a single-purpose container. A
gun case could easily carry candy; a violin case could easily carry a
gun. The privacy interest comes from what the individual is presenting
to society-a violin case is pronouncing to the world that a violin is in-
side, whether or not there is a violin inside. In that same vein, an indi-
vidual carrying a case labeled "guns" knows that society will think guns
are inside of the case. Thus, the individual forms an expectation of pri-
vacy based on what image the container is presenting to the world.
Similarly, the context affects a reasonable person's certainty as to
what lies inside a container. For example, "[o]ne might actually see a
white powder without realizing that it is heroin, but be virtually cer-
tain a balloon contains such a substance in a particular context.'
Logically, if the determination of a single-purpose container is made
from a reasonable person's point of view because it more closely
aligns to an individual's expectations of privacy, the determination
should also include the surrounding circumstances as a reasonable
person would see them. While a gun case may not look like a gun case
to the average person, a gun case next to a box of bullets would begin
to look more like a gun case to the average person. There is no reason
140 Miller, 769 F2d at 560.
141 Brown, 460 US at 751 n 5 (Stevens concurring) (using the example that a visible white
powder may less clearly reveal drugs than a balloon filled with an invisible substance).
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why circumstances should not be included, so long as they are judged
from the reasonable person's view based on social norms.
This is not without precedent. Circumstances and locations often
play a part in determining whether a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy exists. For example, the area immediately surrounding a house (or
"curtilage") may receive Fourth Amendment protection, while the
area a mere fifty yards away may not, depending on the circums-
tances."' Similarly, garbage bags inside of a house are protected while
garbage bags outside of the house are not. ' Because location plays a
part in analyzing whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, it should be included in deciding whether the container quali-
fies as a single-purpose container.
A reason to include the circumstances in the single-purpose con-
tainer determination is that the circumstances surrounding the con-
tainer are well within the control of the individual. An individual can
choose to place the gun next to the box of bullets, or to place the
drugs next to drug paraphernalia. Moreover, since an interpretation of
the circumstances would be based on the reasonable person's view-
point, an individual can gauge what sort of expectation of privacy
would accompany certain circumstances.
Courts that have declined to include the circumstances have also
done so out of concern that the single-purpose container exception
would permit officers to conduct a "warrantless search of any contain-
er found in the vicinity of a suspicious item."'" This overstates the case.
Not all containers lose their expectation of privacy when placed in the
vicinity of a suspicious item. For example, a nondescript cardboard
box inside of a drug den has the same reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as a cardboard box located inside of a preschool does, even
though it is in the vicinity of drugs. Although it is more likely to con-
tain drugs, nothing in the character of the cardboard box changes from
location to location. The circumstances would only change the charac-
ter of the container when the reasonable person would perceive a
change in the character of the box. This limitation means that the sin-
gle-purpose container exception will not simply allow for the warrant-
less search of any container in suspicious circumstances; it will only
allow the warrantless search of those containers that can no longer
142 United States v Dunn, 480 US 294, 304 (1987) (holding that a barn sixty yards from a
house was not within the curtilage).
143 Greenwood, 486 US at 37 (holding that under the third party doctrine, privacy is lost
when information is exposed to any third party).
144 Donnes, 947 F2d at 1438.
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sustain a reasonable expectation of privacy by virtue of their charac-
ter. Moreover, the circumstances are as a reasonable person would see
them, not as an officer would see them. Because social norms include
context, and because expectations of privacy can vary depending on
location, the surrounding circumstances should be included when
making the single-purpose container determination.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches be reasonable;
accordingly, courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment as ba-
lancing an individual's right to privacy with the interests of the gov-
ernment. Given the nature of crime in our society, resolution of the
single-purpose container doctrine is very important. If we follow the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits' interpretation and make the single-purpose
container determination from the layman's perspective, individuals
will have a better idea of their privacy rights, and their constitutional
rights will be better protected. But, if we follow the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits' interpretation and allow officers to use their knowledge and
experience, we give police greater discretion to enforce our laws. Any
resolution must balance these competing interests. This Comment's so-
lution allows police to use their experience when determining if the
criminal nature of the single-purpose container is readily apparent,
while at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of suspected
criminals by clarifying what a single-purpose container is and conform-
ing to the suspects' reasonable expectations of privacy.
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